Introduction
Federally fi.mded research and development centers (FFRDCS) are a unique class of research and development (R&D) facilities that share aspects of private and public ownership. One contemporary observer of the early Atomic Energy Commission laboratories described the arrangement as an amalgamof capitalismand socialism;it has divided the traditional attributes of property and dissolveddiRerencesof form in the organizationof public and private businesses. T'heresult is a politico-economicinnovationwhich defies simple characterization.l Some FFRDCS have been praised as national treasures or jewels in the crown of federal R&D. But FFRDCS have also been the fixms of much criticism through the years, particularly within the Department of Defense, and more recently in the Department of Energy.
FFRDCS' unique blend of private and public ownership, management, and operation has led to occasional friction with both private industry and the federal government. This paper traces the history of FFRDCS through four periods: (1) the World War II era, which saw the birth of federal R&D centers that would eventually become FFRDCS; (2) Many universities around the country were eager to emulate the University of California and the University of Chicago in operating large research centers for the federal government. One of the last acts of General Leslie Groves as director of the MED was to create a new research laboratory in the Northeast, a region to which many of the scientists who had worked on the atomic bomb were returning. Columbia University was a leading candidate for operating the new Brookhawm Laboratory in New York, but several other universities also were qualified and lobbied for the job. Groves suggested a consortium, and in July 1946, nine regional universities formed Associated Universities, Inc. (AUI), which was awarded the contract.* AUI'S success encouraged other universities to establish regional consortia to bid for management contracts for research laboratories of the AEC and the National Science Foundation (NSF). In practice, consortia tended to win awards for basic science facilities, such as the NSF radio astronomy observatories and the Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory, while mission-oriented research and development laboratories were awarded to single universities.
Department of Defense
For the Department of Defense, the compelling reasons for establishing FFRDCS were its needs for (1) policy advice for operational and strategic planning and (2) relatively unbiased technical counsel and integration expertise for major system developments. II In response to the first need, DoD created a series of study and analysis centers ("think tanks"), beginning with RAND in 1946. In response to the second need, it later established several system engineering and technical direction centers.
RAND became the prototype of the think tanks. Toward the end of 1945, General
Henry "Hap" Arnold, commander of the Army Air Forces, proposed a contract with Douglas
Aircraft Company to create a study and analysis center to conduct "scientific study and research on the broad subject of air warfare" with the explicit purpose of advising the Air
Force on future trends in air power, particularly with respect to nuclear weapons. Douglas agreed to the proposal, and Air Force Project RAND (for "R and D") opened its doors at Douglas Aircraft in Santa Monica, California, the following year."
However, it became apparent during the first two years of operation that the arrangement was not satisfactory. Douglas Aircraft began to regard RAND as a business liability, it believed that the Air Force, in its eagerness to appear fair, had favored other contractors in competitive procurements for aircraft production.13 The Air Force (a separate service after September 1947) felt that Douglas was not giving RAND the attention it should and was making an excessive profit from it. By mutual agreement, Douglas Aircraft was released from its contract in 1948, and the RAND Corporation was created as an independent, private entity specifically to operate the analysis center.14 The problems of conflict of interest, real or perceived, would be avoided by using an independent non-profit corporation rather than an industrial contractor. While the evidenceis not entirelyclear, it does seem to be true that contracting methods and specificationsappropriateto the administrationof traditionalfunctions of the federalgovernmenthave been carriedover by brute force and sheer awkwardnessinto the area of scientificresearchcontracting,in which they protect adequatelythe interestsneither of the federalgovernmentnor the contractor.n Not only were FFRDCS proliferating at dizzying rate, but some of the arrangements posed questions of propriety and raised the specter that publicly funded government labs might be competing with private industry.
The Eisenhower administration took an interest in the issue precisely because it regarded much of the work of FFRDCS as more appropriate for industry. In 1960, Maurice
Stans, director of the Bureau of the Budget, issued a bulletin to executive agencies cautioning them on FFRDCS:
Even the operationof a Governmentiownedfacilityby a privateorganizationthrough contractualarrangementdoes not automaticallyassurethat the Governmentis not competingwith privateenterprise.21
For example, the Space Technologies Laboratory (STL) raised eyebrows when its manager, Ramo-Wooldridge, merged with Thompson Products to create TRW, Inc., in 1958.
The new corporation indicated its intent simultaneously to compete for defense production . . perform research, development, and analytic tasks integral to the mission and operations of sponsoring agencies with the DoD;
. maintain core competencies in areas important to the DoD sponsors and employ these competencies to perform high-quality, objective work that cannot be carried out as effectively by other organizations; and q operate in the public interest, free from real or perceived conflicts of interest.41
The 104fi through 106~Congresses were willing to tolerate the level of FFRDC funding in the Defense research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) budget-less than five percent-but seemed determined to hold the line on mission expansion and institutional growth. So long as DoD demonstrates control and restraint in managing its FFRDCS, it probably will not face serious challenges to their continued operation and existence. 
Conclusion
FFRDCS were created by federal government agencies to meet their needs for access to technical and scientific talent that was hard to attract into federal or milita~service. The " proliferation of FFRDCS during the first hdf of the Cold War led to policy debates about their role, the extent to which they competed with private industry, and whether they usurped governmental functions. Several studies endorsed a role for FFRDCS while recommending that they be controlled and limited to specific defined missions. 
